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Attila Gidó
The Hungarian Bureaucracy and the Administrative 
Costs of  the Holocaust in Northern Transylvania
In the course of  May and June 1944, forty-five trains crammed with Jews from 
Northern Transylvania were sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau, making the region “Judenfrei” 
in accordance with the Nazi vision of  the “Final Solution.” This article explores how 
the extermination process and its consequences, including the costs incurred, were 
approached and handled by the central and local authorities of  Northern Transylvania 
as bureaucratic tasks. As I show, in addition to participating directly in the processes of  
genocide, local authorities also aimed to assure “the reparation of  material and financial 
damages” caused by ghettoization, while the expropriated assets of  the deported and 
their unresolved financial transactions were subject to further administrative action. 
Drawing on scattered documents held in various provincial branches of  the Romanian 
National Archives and materials from the Cluj-based People’s Courts from 1946, in 
this article I discuss the high-level of  continuity among Hungarian administrative 
personnel in 1944 and demonstrate that practically the entire Hungarian state apparatus 
participated in the implementation of  the Final Solution. I argue that the economic 
costs incurred by “Christian Hungarians” may have been negligible compared to the 
overall theft of  “Jewish property,” but the administrative tasks related to ghettoization 
and deportation were substantial.
Keywords: World War II, Holocaust, Northern Transylvania, ghettoization, deportation, 
bureaucracy 
The so-called Second Vienna Award, which was issued on August 30, 1940 and 
which essentially made northern Transylvania part of  Hungary while leaving 
the rest of  the province (including most of  Bánát and swathes of  Partium) in 
Romania, temporarily brought an end to the territorial dispute between Hungary 
and Romania. With this legal change (accompanied by the occupation of  the 
region in question by the Hungarian army), according to the results of  the 
1941 census 151,312 people of  the Jewish faith again found themselves under 
Hungarian rule. The Jewish laws that were brought into effect, however, were 
based on racial categories, so they applied not only to practicing Jews, but also 
to Christians who, according to the provisions of  the law, were legally regarded 
as Jewish. Thus the anti-Semitic measures that were taken by the Hungarian 
government affected 164,052 people living in northern Transylvania, or 6.4 
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percent of  the population. From this point on, the circumstances of  the Jewry 
of  northern Transylvania in many ways resembled the circumstances of  the 
Jewry of  Trianon Hungary (by which I mean the territory of  Hungary following 
the ratification of  the Peace Treaty of  Trianon in 1920, which is almost entirely 
contiguous with the territory of  Hungary today), though as I will demonstrate, 
there were some significant regional differences.1 
The occupation of  Hungary by the German army, which began on March 
19, 1944, accelerated the pace of  events and proved fatal to the Jewry of  
the country.2 By the end of  March, German troops had arrived in northern 
Transylvania. There were several phases to the implementation of  the Final 
Solution in Hungary and northern Transylvania.3 The occupation of  the country 
did not make ghettoization and deportation inevitable. 
In the course of  the ghettoization and deportation of  the Jewry, the territory 
was divided into two “deportation zones.” The first was the region known as 
Máramaros (Maramureş in Romanian), which included an area that today lies 
north of  the Romanian border in Ukraine (historically Máramaros is essentially 
a valley of  the Tisza River surrounded by mountains and thick forests). The 
second zone consisted of  Szatmár county (roughly equivalent with what today is 
Sătmar county in Romania), Bihar county (roughly equivalent with what today is 
Bihor county in Romania), Inner Transylvania, and the so-called Székely Land, a 
region in eastern Transylvania which to this day has a large Hungarian-speaking 
majority. 
The plans for the assembly and deportation of  the Jewry belonging to the 
first zone were drawn up during a meeting that was held in the city of  Munkács 
(today Mukacheve in Ukraine) on April 12, 1944. The plans for the deportation 
of  the Jewry of  the second zone were completed in the course of  meetings that 
took place on April 26 in Szatmárnémeti (today Satu Mare in Romania) and 
on April 28 in Marosvásárhely (today Târgu Mureş in Romania). After having 
returned from the meetings, the leading local civil servants, police, gendarmes, 
and sub-prefects again conferred on the measures that would be adopted in 
1  Randolph L. Braham, The Politics of  Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981), 167.
2  Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 370. Christian Gerlach and Götz Aly, Az utolsó fejezet. Reálpolitika, 
ideológia és a magyar zsidók legyilkolása, 1944/1945 (Budapest: Noran, 2005), 114. Gábor Kádár and Zoltán 
Vági, Hullarablás. A magyar zsidók gazdasági megsemmisítése (Budapest: Hannah Arendt Egyesület–Jaffa Kiadó, 
2005), 109.
3  Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vági, A végső döntés. Berlin, Budapest, Birkenau 1944 (Budapest: Jaffa Kiadó, 
2013), 234–36.
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various settlements to implement ghettoization, including for instance the sites 
of  the ghettoes themselves.4 
Just before the process of  ghettoization was implemented and over the 
course of  the month of  May, Undersecretary of  State for Internal Affairs 
László Endre traveled throughout northern Transylvania.5 He was present 
for the meeting in Marosvásárhely on April 28, at which some 200 people 
from the Székely Land took part, including the lord lieutenants, sub-prefects, 
mayors, chief  administrative officers of  the districts, and chiefs of  police and 
the gendarmerie.6 Endre gave precise instructions concerning the process of  
ghettoization at the meeting, as well as the ways in which to ensure the effective 
assembly of  the Jews, the organization and operation of  the ghettos, and the 
management of  “Jewish property,” including real estate and moveable assets.7 
He then held a meeting in Kolozsvár (today Cluj in Romania) on the process 
of  ghettoization, and by April 30 he had already reached the city of  Nagyvárad 
(today Oradea in Romania) on the western fringes of  Transylvania (actually in 
the region known as Partium), where he gave oral instructions to the mayor, 
László Gyapay, regarding ghettoization and the various administrative costs it 
would involve. Gyapay, referring to these instructions as authorization to act, 
implemented a series of  measures affecting the agricultural properties and 
moveable belongings of  Jews.8
The deportations in northern Transylvania began on May 16 in 
Máramarossziget (today Sighetu Marmaţiei in Romania) and ended on June 
7 in Kolozsvár. 131,639 Jews were deported from northern Transylvania to 
Auschwitz-Birkenau.9 Lieutenant colonel of  the gendarmerie László Ferenczy, 
4  Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 538–39 and 566–67.
5  In the course of  his travels, Endre observed the process of  ghettoization and the conditions in the 
ghettos not only in northern Transylvania, but in all of  provincial Hungary. Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 
587–588.
6  Serviciul Judeţean al Arhivelor Naţionale Cluj (Cluj Branch of  the Romanian National Archive, henceforth 
SJAN Cluj), Fond no. 1295 (People’s Court), dossier 11/1946, file 1.
7  According to materials used in cases tried by the People’s Court of  Cluj in 1946, two participants 
in the meeting in Marosvásárhely had raised objections in connection with the rounding up of  children 
under six years of  age and the provision of  food. However, neither of  them was opposed to the social 
marginalization, ghettoization, deportation or genocide of  the Jews. Rather, they merely gave voice to their 
views on questions of  detail. SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 1295, dossier 11/1946, f. 1.
8  Decree number 13392/1944. II of  László Gyapay, issued on May 12, 1944. Yad Vashem Archives, TR. 
16, 28. dossier, f. 18–22.
9  Randolph L. Braham, ed., Az észak-erdélyi holokauszt földrajzi enciklopédiája (Budapest, Kolozsvár: Park 
Könyvkiadó, Koinónia Könyvkiadó, 2008), 33. Randolph L. Braham, ed., The Geographical Encyclopedia of  the 
Holocaust in Hungary (Evantson, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2013), lxix.
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who served as a communications officer between the Hungarian gendarmerie 
and the German security forces, sent regular reports on and accounts of  the 
state of  affairs with regards to the gathering together and deportation of  the 
Jews to Minister of  the Interior Andor Jaross.10 Of  the 164,052 people who 
were defined as Jews under the law, between 35,000 and 40,000 survived the 
Holocaust. Most of  the survivors, some 25,000 to 30,000 people, were among 
those deported. The others were liberated from forced labor units or managed 
to survive the upheavals in some other way, for instance simply by going into 
hiding or fleeing to Romania.11
There is, alongside the reading of  the history of  the virtual annihilation of  
the Hungarian Jewry as a tale of  immeasurable suffering, a cold, dispassionate 
bureaucratic side to the story as well. The creation and maintenance of  the 
ghettos, the organization of  the transportation of  the deportees, the assessment 
of  the material demands of  the non-Jewish population, and the provision of  
compensation for costs that arose represented an unusual challenge for the 
county and municipal authorities. By dealing with these and similar administrative 
issues, civil servants and officials took important preliminary steps in bringing 
about the suffering and deaths of  masses.
The Hungarian and international historiography has already dealt in detail 
with the role of  state bureaucracies in the Holocaust. In his classic study on the 
connections between modernity and the Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman writes 
that the German bureaucracy was able to organize and implement ghettoization 
and deportation with such dispassion because it deprived the objects of  its 
measures of  their humanity, reducing them to mere numbers.12 In the Hungarian 
secondary literature, Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vági have provided perhaps the 
10  With regards to northern Transylvania, the first report was sent from Kolozsvár on May 3, 1944 and 
the last was sent from Hatvan on June 8. Judit Molnár, Csendőrtiszt a Markóban. Ferenczy László csendőr alezredes 
a népbíróság előtt (Budapest: Scolar, Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, 2014), 280–306.
11  We know the names and personal information of  people who survived deportation and returned to 
northern Transylvania following liberation. According to a list from 1946, there were some 20,000 such 
people. In addition to them, the number of  people who survived but did not return following liberation, 
choosing instead either to travel to countries in the West or even go overseas, was somewhere between 
8,000 and 10,000. For a list of  the survivors, which includes their personal information, see Attila Gidó, 
20 000 names/név/nume. Counted Remnant of  Northern Transylvania (Cluj-Napoca: ISPMN, 2016), forthcoming. 
See also: Braham, Az észak-erdélyi holokauszt, 470.
12  Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca–New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
102–04. See also: Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 
2001), 73–78, Christopher R. Browning, Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 169.
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most recent overview of  ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Carpathian Basin, 
the history of  modern anti-Semitism, and the path that led to the Holocaust.13 
Kádár and Vági came to the conclusion that the annihilation of  the Hungarian 
Jewry “was caused by a tragic meeting” of  Nazi Germany’s program of  
extermination and an attitude of  exclusion that had been present in Hungarian 
society for centuries.14 According to them, this attitude of  exclusion, the “official 
routine” of  anti-Semitism, and the opportunities that arose to make personal 
profit together were sufficient to prompt the majority of  civil servants working 
in the organs of  state administration to perform the tasks that were assigned to 
them in the course of  the slaughter of  the Jews of  Hungary in an orderly and 
reliable fashion.15 In his study of  the events that took place in Jász-Nagykun-
Szolnok county, László Csősz also came to the conclusion that most of  the 
civil servants did not actually espouse the principles of  National Socialism, nor 
were they committed supporters of  the physical annihilation of  the Jewry, but 
rather agreed “only” that the role of  Jews in economic and social life should be 
restricted. Nonetheless, in 1944 most of  them, influenced by varying motivations, 
participated, whether reluctantly or with enthusiasm, in the implementation of  
the Final Solution.16 Drawing on the findings and insights of  these authors, in 
this essay I closely examine the administrative issues and costs that came up in 
the course of  the deportation and extermination of  the Jewry of  Hungary in 
order to arrive at a more detailed and precise picture of  the ways in which civil 
servants working in state administration took part in the Final Solution and the 
extent of  this form of  collaboration.
In Hungary, as was the case in Germany and every country or territory 
that was affected by the Holocaust, the implementation of  the Final Solution 
depended not simply on the acts of  the political elites, but also on the cooperation 
and collaboration of  everyday people, including civil servants who worked in 
state administration. Following the occupation of  Hungary by the German 
army in March 1944, many of  the high ranking civil servants and government 
officials were replaced or given positions in different offices. However, most of  
the people in lower levels of  state administration, including the police and the 
13  Kádár and Vági, A végső döntés.
14  Ibid., 12–13.
15  Ibid., 247.
16  László Csősz, Konfliktusok és kölcsönhatások. Zsidók Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok megye történetében (Szolnok: 
MNL Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Levéltár, 2014), 192–94 and 207.
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gendarmerie, remained in their positions.17 Very few of  the sub-prefects and 
mayors, who played important roles in county administration, were removed 
from their posts, in all likelihood because in the first few weeks it already became 
apparent that most of  the influential figures in local administration were loyal 
to the new political leadership and would implement the anti-Semitic measures 
as ordered.18 Some of  the people in low ranking offices were replaced or 
moved to different positions, but this was the exception rather than the rule.19 
The ghettoization of  the Jewish population was executed by two organs of  
power, but the necessary infrastructure was provided by the sub-prefects, lord 
lieutenants, chief  constables, mayors, and deputy mayors, along with other state 
administrators with local or regional authority. With very few exceptions, they 
collaborated in the expropriation, ghettoization, and deportation of  the Jews.
The situation in northern Transylvania essentially resembled the situation 
in Hungary. In late April, i.e. before the process of  ghettoization had begun, 
a decision was reached regarding the removal of  seven of  the ten county lord 
lieutenants.20 Also in April 1944, Béla Bethlen, lord lieutenant of  Szolnok-
Doboka and Beszterce-Naszód counties, asked to be removed from his posts. In 
the end, he was relieved of  his position as lord lieutenant of  Beszterce-Naszód 
county, but he continued to perform the tasks of  lord lieutenant in Szolnok-
Doboka county. Ödön Inczédy Joksman served as lord lieutenant of  Kolozs 
county and the city of  Kolozsvár. At his request, he was relieved of  the post of  
lord lieutenant of  Kolozsvár (he was replaced by Lajos Vargha, who earlier had 
served as deputy prosecutor of  the city), but he continued to hold the post of  
lord lieutenant for the county.21 Thus only with significant qualifications could 
17  See: Judit Molnár, “Csendőrök, rendőrök, hivatalnokok a Soá idején” in Magyar megfontolások a Soáról, 
ed. Hamp Gábor, Horányi Özséb, and Rábai László (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 1999), 124–33.
18  Molnár, Csendőrök, rendőrök, hivatalnokok, 127.
19  Kádár and Vági, A végső döntés, 247.
20  In northern Transylvania, including Máramaros, there were eleven counties, but two of  them, Szolnok-
Doboka (the center of  which was Dés) and Beszterce-Naszód (the seat of  which was Beszterce), were 
under count Béla Bethlen, who served as lord lieutenant of  both until April 1944. Budapesti Közlöny, April 
27, 1944. no. 94, 1. Of  the seven county-level lord lieutenants who were relieved of  their posts, several 
also had positions as lord lieutenant of  a municipality. In addition to them, on April 26 Endre Hlatky, the 
lord lieutenant of  Nagyvárad, was relieved of  his post, as was Ödön Inczédy Joksman, lord lieutenant of  
Kolozsvár. Budapesti Közlöny April 27, 1944, no. 94, 1–2; Budapesti Közlöny May 7, 1944, no. 103, 1.
21  Inczédy’s signature is found on several documents that were issued in the middle of  May 1944. 
SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 3 (Lord Lieutenancy of  Kolozs County), batch number 1319 (Racial problems, 1–2 
volumes). Inczédy’s removal at the end of  April from the position of  lord lieutenant of  Kolozsvár and the 
appointment of  Lajos Vargha were announced in Kolozsvár Thj. Sz. Kir. Város Hivatalos Lapja May 1, 1944. 
no. 9, 72.
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these individuals be included among the civil servants who voluntarily resigned 
from their positions.22
The sub-prefects, who played one of  the most important roles in the process 
of  ghettoization, almost without exception remained at their posts.23 However, 
in Kolozsvár, Marosvásárhely, Nagyvárad and Szatmárnémeti, which in May and 
June served as the largest centers for railway transportation, new mayors were 
appointed.24 (Tibor Keledy, who had served as mayor of  Kolozsvár, was made 
lord mayor of  Budapest on April 8, 1944. He was replaced by László Vásárhelyi, 
who had served as deputy mayor of  Kolozsvár.) Over the course of  April and 
at the beginning of  May, many of  the chief  constables were also replaced, for 
instance in Székelyhíd (today Săcueni in Romania), Szatmárnémeti, Zilah (today 
Zalău in Romania), and Felsővisó (today Vişeu de Sus in Romania), or simply 
given different positions, moved for instance from the district of  Nagyszalonta 
(today Salonta in Romania) to Titel (today in Serbia), from Nagysomkút (today 
şomcuta Mare in Romania) to Halmi (today Halmeu in Romania), or from 
Szilágycseh (today Cehu Silvaniei in Romania) to Nagykálló.25 The essential 
purpose of  these changes was to ensure that the chief  constables, who played 
a key role in the implementation and enforcement of  the various anti-Semitic 
measures in the rural districts and on the county level, be distant from their 
familiar environments and social worlds so that in new, unfamiliar contexts, 
surrounded essentially by strangers, they would carry out the disenfranchisement 
and expropriation of  the Jews and ensure that they were gathered together into 
the collection centers to expedite the process of  deportation.26 
22  In his memoirs, which were completed in the 1970s, Béla Bethlen at the same time writes that on 
many occasions he urged the Ministry of  Interior to reach a decision regarding his request to be relieved of  
his position as lord lieutenant of  Szolnok-Doboka county, but his petition was simply buried in paperwork. 
Béla Bethlen, Észak-Erdély kormánybiztosa voltam (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1989), 146.
23  For instance, Kolozs county got a new sub-prefect when, on June 2, 1944, Ferenc Szász died and left 
the position empty. He was replaced by Gábor Ajtay, who had served as the sub-prefect of  Máramaros 
county and, as of  May 30, had been the leader of  the “separate unit” that had been created by the XXI/b. 
subdivision of  the Ministry of  Interior and had played an important role in ghettoization and deportation. 
Oliver Lustig, ed., Procesul ghetourilor din Nordul Transilvaniei, vol. 1 (Bucureşti: AERVH, 2007), 74.
24  Magyarország tiszti cím- és névtára, 1944 (Budapest: M. Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1944), 79. 
Budapesti Közlöny April 9, 1944, no. 80, 1 and April 21, no. 89, 1.
25  Magyarország tiszti cím- és névtára, 1944 (Budapest: M. Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1944), 79. Cf. 
Budapesti Közlöny June 3, 1944, no. 124, 1–2.
26  Molnár, Csendőrök, rendőrök, hivatalnokok, 128.
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Many civil servants moved up on the professional ladder in this period, 
so for them, these changes meant opportunities to build their careers.27 The 
May and June issues of  Budapesti Közlöny (Budapest Gazette) indicate that in 
general low level civil servants were advanced in greater proportions in northern 
Transylvania than in the other areas of  provincial Hungary. While in other regions 
emphasis was placed on transferring civil servants to different settlements, civil 
servants in northern Transylvania often remained in the communities where 
they had been employed and were simply promoted. This may have been due 
in part to the fact that, when the territory had become part of  Hungary again 
in 1940, many civil servants from Trianon Hungary or functionaries who had 
fled from Transylvania to Hungary in the wake of  World War I had been given 
positions in the newly acquired territory. In 1944, most of  these people were 
still serving in northern Transylvania. Thus in all likelihood, they were not as 
familiar with the local society or as closely connected to it as their Transylvanian 
colleagues and were therefore considered more reliable.28
Historians have taken note of  several high ranking civil servants in northern 
Transylvania who resigned from their offices for ethical reasons, thereby refusing 
to take part in the persecution of  the Jews. Baron János Jósika, who served 
as lord lieutenant of  Szilágy county, and János Schilling, who was sub-prefect 
of  Szolnok-Doboka county, were among them. Jósika resigned when sub-
prefect Endre Gazda informed him of  what had taken place at the meeting in 
Szatmárnémeti on April 26 (Gazda had been present for the meeting).29 Schilling 
took part in the implementation of  the measures that laid the groundwork for 
the ghettoization of  the Jews of  the county, but on May 2, 1944, one day before 
27  This was the case for Géza Czanik, the chief  constable of  Aszód. At the suggestion of  the Minister 
of  the Interior, he was named sub-prefect of  Szolnok-Doboka county by the Regent of  Hungary, Miklós 
Horthy. Similarly, Dezső Gálffy, a chief  constable on the county level, became lord lieutenant of  Udvarhely 
county, today Odorheiu county in Romania, and József  Kadicsfalvi, who was magistrate of  Felsővisó, 
was made lord lieutenant. Czanik replaced János Schilling, who had resigned from his position, on May 2, 
1944. He was part of  László Endre’s personal escort, and he guaranteed the efficient implementation of  
the Final Solution in Szolnok-Doboka county. Budapesti Közlöny June 3, 1944, no. 124, 1. Ágnes Hegyi, “Dés 
zsidó közösségének virágzása és hanyatlása,” in Tanulmányok a holokausztról, vol. 3, ed. Randolph L. Braham 
(Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2004), 171.
28  25.1 percent of  the people working in public administration in northern Transylvania and 16.4 percent 
of  the people working in the judicial branch of  government had been sent from the territory of  Trianon 
Hungary in 1940 and 1941. In contrast, all of  the people working in the police and gendarmerie units were 
Transylvanian. See Edit Csilléry, “Közalkalmazottak és köztisztviselők Észak-Erdélyben a második bécsi 
döntést követően,” Limes 2 (2006): 79.
29  Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 575.
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ghettoization began, he went to the hospital and had his (perfectly healthy) 
appendix removed and resigned from his post.30 However, these people were 
exceptions, and most of  the leaders and staff  of  the state administration in 
northern Transylvania reliably performed the tasks that were assigned to them 
in the dispossession, ghettoization, and deportation of  the Jews. 
Jewish inhabitants of  rural settlements were gathered together for deportation 
by the gendarmerie, which was under the authority of  the Ministry of  Interior 
and the Ministry of  Defense. The Hungarian gendarmerie was broken up into 
ten different districts, each of  which was under the command of  a gendarmerie 
colonel. Following the occupation of  Hungary by the German army, no changes 
were made to the leadership of  the gendarmerie, so when the ghettoization and 
deportation of  the Jews was taking place, the same people were in command 
as had been before. In contrast, changes were made to the leading cadres of  
the police forces, and many commanding officers were removed from their 
posts. There were even a few who resigned, for instance Antal Örményi, police 
captain of  Gyergyószentmiklós (today Gheorgheni in Romania).31 Of  the ten 
gendarmerie districts, two (the ninth and the tenth) had their seats in northern 
Transylvania, one in the city of  Kolozsvár and the other in Marosvásárhely. 
The gendarmerie of  the Kolozsvár district was under the command of  Tibor 
Paksi-Kiss and the Marosvásárhely district was under the command of  János 
Papp. Both Paksi-Kiss and Papp had begun serving in their posts before 1944. 
Officially, it was Paksi-Kiss who supervised the ghettoization and deportation 
of  the Jewry of  all of  Transylvania, including the areas under the command of  
Papp.32
The search for and rounding up of  Jews was done by the gendarmes of  
the districts. In the collection centers and the ghettos, however, the theft of  
Jewish belongings, the loading of  Jews onto train cars, and the final deportation 
of  the Jews was done by gendarmes who belonged to subunits that had been 
30  Zoltán Singer, Volt egyszer egy Dés. Bethlen, Magyarlápos, Retteg, Nagyilonda és környéke (Tel Aviv: Dés és 
Vidékéről Elszármazottak Landsmannschaftja, 1970), 422. Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 414.
31  Kádár and Vági, A végső döntés, 247. Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 414.
32  Refugees from areas that today are part of  Ukraine fled into the territory of  János Papp’s gendarmerie 
district, thus he had to handle the administrative tasks that arose as a consequence of  their presence as well. 
We know, however, that independent of  this, Papp collaborated in the ghettoization of  the Jewry of  the 
Székely Land. He took part in the meeting that was held in Marosvásárhely on April 28, and together with 
sub-prefect Zsigmond Márton, lieutenant colonel János Zalántay and major N. Schröder he supervised 
the rounding up of  the Jews of  Maros-Torda county (today a part of  Mureş and a part of  Cluj county in 
Romania). Braham, The Geographical Encyclopedia of  the Holocaust, 657–59.
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created within the individual districts. These gendarmes in general did not come 
from the given settlements, but rather had been brought to the area from distant 
regions. This measure was taken in order to prevent Jews from bribing people 
they might have known personally, as well as to ensure that no mercy would 
be shown by the people charged with carrying out these measures. This is why 
gendarmes were sent from Miskolc, Szászrégen (today Reghin in Romania), and 
Szeged to Máramarossziget, for instance, or from Zilah to Dés (today Dej in 
Romania).33
While these processes were underway, the bureaucracy also dealt with the 
belongings and real estate that had been taken from the Jews, as well as the costs 
that arose in the course of  their ghettoization and deportation, the assessment of  
damages, and the provision of  compensation. Later, dealing with the economic 
and social problems that arose as a consequence of  the ghettoization among the 
members of  the population who were not defined by the laws as “Jewish” (i.e. 
the so-called Christian population) became the first priority. The creation of  a 
“judenrein” provincial Hungary (and therefore a “judenrein” Transylvania), the 
division of  stolen properties, and the provision of  compensation for claims 
of  damage were done by a stratum of  officials and an administrative system 
the original responsibility of  which had been the completion of  bureaucratic 
tasks that were important to the preservation of  social cohesion and stability. 
In the changed domestic political circumstances and as a consequence of  the 
anti-Semitic public sentiment that prevailed at the time, this bureaucracy was 
capable, without having undergone any major structural changes, of  providing 
the infrastructure, the “administrative foundation,” for the annihilation of  the 
Hungarian Jewry.34
While several of  the administrative and political models in Transylvania were 
borrowed from Hungary, there were regional peculiarities. The conservative, 
right-wing Hungarian political elite of  Transylvania was quite convinced, as 
indeed was a significant part of  Transylvanian Hungarian society, that in the 
period between 1918 and 1940, when the entire territory, northern and southern 
Transylvania, had been part of  the Romanian Kingdom, the Jewry had betrayed 
Hungary and had represented the interests of  the Romanian elites in power. This 
accusation found expression not merely in the period following the outbreak 
of  war, but rather had been a discernible motif  of  public life in Transylvanian 
33  Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 411.
34  See Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 104.
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Hungarian communities since 1920.35 The platform of  Erdélyi Párt (Transylvanian 
Party), which was created in 1940–41, was seen as providing political legitimacy 
for the measures that were taken against Jews. Between 1941 and 1944, this 
political party represented the political interests of  the Hungarian communities 
of  Transylvania in the Hungarian parliament, and it enjoyed widespread social 
support and influence in the region. According to the eighth point of  its platform, 
the party approved of  measures “against the Jewry, which voluntarily broke 
from the body of  the Transylvanian Hungarians when under Romanian rule,” 
and indeed it strongly urged the implementation of  measures that would remove 
Jews from public life and every sphere of  economic life “until the question had 
been settled on a European scale.”36 The right-wing in Transylvania, which grew 
increasingly influential after 1940, also emphasized its view according to which 
the path of  Transylvanian Hungarians and Transylvanian Jews had forever split, 
since the Jews were the enemy of  Germany, the state which had made territorial 
revision in 1940 possible.37 While the process of  ghettoization was underway, 
the Transylvanian Party justified the expropriation of  Jews with the claim that 
the belongings and real estate that had been acquired had to be used to improve 
the social circumstances of  the Hungarian population.38 Thus the collaboration 
of  the so-called Christian population, including administrators of  various ranks 
and positions, was influenced by a number of  factors, but one of  them was the 
branding of  the Jews of  Transylvania as outsiders and members of  a group that 
had deliberately parted ways with the Hungarians.
35  Ferenc Sz. Horváth, Elutasítás és alkalmazkodás között. A romániai magyar kisebbségi elit politikai stratégiái 
(1931–1940) (Csíkszereda: Pro-Print Könyvkiadó, 2007), 118. Gábor Egry, Az erdélyiség “színeváltozása”. 
Kísérlet az Erdélyi Párt ideológiájának és identitáspolitikájának elemzésére, 1940–1944 (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 
2008), 157–59.
36  Cited in Egry, Az erdélyiség “színeváltozása,” 159.
37  Holly Case, Between States. The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2009), 182.
38  The question of  fragmentation, in other words the linking of  the economic plunder of  the Jews and 
the problems of  the ethnically heterogeneous territories of  northern Transylvania, can also be observed. 
See SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 3, batch number 1319, 3. vols., dossier 7336/1944, f. 2. Compare with Franz Sz. 
Horváth, “Ethnic Policies, Social Compensation, and Economic Reparations: The Holocaust in Northern 
Transylvania,” East Central Europe 39 (2012): 112–16.
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Administrative Issues before Ghettoization 
On April 20, 1944, Antal Kunder, Minister of  Trade and Transportation, issued 
decree number 50.500/1944 KKM on the seizure of  the goods, furnishings, 
and equipment belonging to Jewish businesses.39 The decree went into effect 
on April 21, and in accordance with it, the Jewish businesses in the various 
settlements were stamped as such on that very day, lists of  them were made, and 
these lists were sent within the space of  a few days to the Chamber of  Trade 
and Industry to which the given settlement belonged.40 The surviving sources 
suggest that at the time the members of  the non-Jewish population were most 
concerned with the fate of  possessions of  theirs that had been left for repair or 
for some other reason in the workshops and business now under sequestration. 
They besieged the authorities with questions and requests, and the rumor spread 
that they would not be given back the belongings that had been left with the 
Jewish merchants and tradesmen.41 On May 5, 1944, the Minister of  Trade and 
Transportation issued decree number 56.912/1944 KKM, with which he sought 
to address these questions and lay these rumors to rest. According to the decree, 
between May 8 and May 20, Jewish merchants and tradesmen would have to 
hand over or return to its (so-called) Christian owner any article that had been 
ordered before April 21 or left in their places of  business for repairs, alterations, 
or exchange. This was to take place with the shutters to the establishments only 
half  open. The daily press in northern Transylvania published this news on May 
7 and 8.42 With regards to the implementation of  the decree, the sub-prefects 
of  the region gave instructions to the district chief  constables and the mayors 
of  the cities one or two days after the news had appeared in the papers, i.e. on 
May 8 and 9.43
39  Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 510.
40  Ibid.
41  “Zsidó üzletekben levő tárgyak tulajdonosait idejében értesítik a kiváltás módozatairól” [The owners 
of  articles in Jewish businesses will be informed of  the ways of  retrieving them in time], Keleti Újság, May 
6, 1944, 5.
42  On May 7, Keleti Újság reported on the issue and content of  the decree, followed by a similar report 
in Magyar Újság on May 8. Both dailies were published in Kolozsvár, but they were distributed throughout 
northern Transylvania. Enikő Orsolya Nagy, “Mit tudhatott az észak-erdélyi magyar lakosság a zsidóellenes 
intézkedésekről?,” in Tanulmányok a holokausztról, vol. 6, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Budapest: Múlt és Jövő, 
2014), 52.
43  On May 9, 1944, Kálmán Szent-Királyi, the sub-prefect of  Udvarhely county, sent the text of  the 
decree to the chief  constables and the mayor of  Székelyudvarhely. We also know that the decree was 
received by the sub-prefect of  Háromszék county (today Covasna county in Romania) on May 8. SJAN 
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People who sought to retrieve items they had left with Jewish tradesmen or 
take possession of  articles they had ordered and already paid for could only do 
so if  they first submitted a request to the authorities responsible for commerce 
or the office of  finance. The ghettoization of  the Jews of  the region for the 
most part had been completed by this time. Thus the former owners of  the 
businesses were no longer able to tend to the requests. Instead, “Christian” 
custodians who were not regarded as Jews (in the case of  workshops and smaller 
factories) performed this task, or in some cases they were done by the municipal 
authorities. In the case of  businesses that were being closed and put out of  
operation, the return or bestowal of  such articles was overseen by committees 
consisting of  three people. These committees were formed under the oversight 
of  the office of  the mayor or the office of  the chief  constable, and one member 
had to be a civil servant, while the other two had to be merchants.44 In many 
cases, this all took place well after the May 20 deadline. On May 19, the mayor of  
Székelyudvarhely (today Odorheiu Secuiesc in Romania) announced that people 
who sought to retrieve items from the Jewish-owned businesses that had been 
closed had 48 hours to present themselves at the city hall.45 In Nagybánya (today 
Baia Mare in Romania) the return of  such articles to their owners probably took 
place much later, at the beginning of  July, as indicated by notification number 
1465/1944, which was issued by the leader of  the city’s excise office on July 2. 
In this notification, he informed the mayor that the financial directorship of  
the city of  Szatmárnémeti had given permission for the distribution of  articles 
of  property belonging to (so-called) Christians that were being held in Jewish 
dwellings, factories, and workshops. An announcement to this effect was to be 
made public on July 3, and on the subsequent days the news was spread far and 
wide.46 Sometimes, it took months for these issues to be settled, and sometimes 
they were never resolved. Before ghettoization had begun, Tibor Gortvay 
Tihamér, an architect from Budapest, paid 8,000 pengő to Bernát Schöffler, a 
merchant from Palotailva (today Luncu Bradului in Romania). He never received 
Cluj, Fond no. 151 (Northern Transylvanian Hungarian Military Administration), archival number 219, box 
3, dossier 4/1944, f. 4–5., SJAN Covasna (Sfântu Gheorghe Office of  the Romanian State Archive), Fond 
no. 9 (Lord Lieutenant’s Office of  Covasna County), archival number 16, dossier 2/1944, f. 4–5.
44  The instructions that were given by the Székely District Chamber of  Industry for the Mayor’s Office 
of  Székelyudvarhely and the Office of  the Chief  Constable. SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 151, archival number 219, 
box 3, dossier 36/1944, f. 4–5.
45  SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 151, archival number 219, box 3, dossier 36/1944, f. 1–2.
46  SJAN Maramureş (Baia Mare Office of  the Romanian National Archive), Fond no. 1 (Mayor’s Office), 
Acte Administrative (Administrative Documents), dossier 1168/1944, vol. 1, f. 141.
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the building materials he had ordered, however, since Schöffler in the meantime 
had been taken to the ghetto in Szászrégen. The last source regarding the case 
of  the Budapest architect is dated August 31, 1944. On that day, a government 
committee bearing the name “Committee for the Solution of  Issues pertaining to 
Jewish Pecuniary and Property Rights” sent a transcript to the Royal Hungarian 
Financial Directorship in the city of  Marosvásárhely urging them to resolve the 
case promptly.47
On May 3, the transportation of  the Jews to the ghetto began. The fate 
of  the businesses that were owned by merchants and tradesmen who had been 
taken to the ghetto remained uncertain for days. In most of  the settlements, there 
was great uncertainty regarding the future of  the workshops, that had been left 
without owners. According to decree number 50.500/1944 KKM, enterprises 
that were important to the national economy could continue to be in operation 
and so-called Christian entrepreneurial leaders were needed to oversee them. In 
many cases, however, a great deal of  time passed before these “custodians” were 
named to their positions.48 In many cases, the staff  took over the management 
of  the workshops and factories, which meant, for instance, that they took new 
orders and they used the raw materials that were on hand to continue production. 
The Craftsmen’s Association of  Kolozsvár submitted protests against this 
practice to the trade authorities of  the first instance, contending that sloppy, 
amateurish work was being done and raw materials that were essential to the 
national economy were being used in a manner that betrayed a dire lack of  
expertise.49 
The distribution of  the businesses that had been closed took place in 
accordance with decree number 2.120/1944. ME, which was passed on June 
10 and announced on June 14. Across the country (and thus in northern 
Transylvania as well), the first people to be given places of  business that had 
been stolen from their Jewish owners were merchants and tradesmen whose 
businesses, workshops, or factories had been damaged or destroyed by bombs 
47  Hungarian National Archives, K498 (Government Commissioner Appointed for the Solution to 
Issues Pertaining to Jewish Pecuniary and Property Rights), batch 3, documents of  the IX. department, 
document 539/1944, f. 1–5. (K498 – 1944 – b – IX – 539, f. 1–5.).
48  Kádár and Vági, Hullarablás, 310.
49  “Az Ipartestület tiltakozott az ellen, hogy a zsidó üzemeket az alkalmazottak vezessék” [The 
Craftsmen’s Association objected to the Jewish factories being run by the staff], Keleti Újság, May 17, 1944, 
7. On May 14, at almost the same time as these objections were being raised, decree number 23.200/1944 
Ip.M. was published in Budapesti Közlöny. It addressed the question of  the delegation of  leaders for the 
businesses. Braham, The Politics of  Genocide, 510–11.
The Holocaust as an Administrative Issue in Northern Transylvania
655
or whose enterprises happened to be located in areas that had become part 
of  the ghetto.50 Of  the (so-called) Christian merchants and tradesmen whose 
businesses had been damaged in the bombing of  Kolozsvár on June 2, 1944, 96 
took part in this legalized form of  theft.51 
In the meantime, people who had been employed by Jews worried about 
the wages they had not been paid. The general practice was for the municipal 
trade authorities or the cities themselves to pay lost wages, and these institutions 
returned articles to their owners as well.52 In many cases unpaid wages were 
covered using monies that had been taken from Jews and put in the city treasury. 
This was the solution adopted by the mayor of  Székelyudvarhely, who on June 
12, 1944, referring to the second point of  the sixth paragraph of  decree number 
1600/1944 ME, ordered the payment of  more than 3,100 pengő to 14 people.53 
This sum covered work that had been done in the period beginning in early April 
and ending in late May.54
The question of  the retrieval of  various articles and possessions was a 
matter of  concern not only for the civilian population, but also for various 
institutions. In some case, library books were among the articles that had 
remained in the dwellings of  Jews. For instance, a request that was made by 
a craftsmen’s association in the city of  Csíkszereda (today Miercurea Ciuc in 
Romania) to the office of  the mayor indicates that members who were defined 
as Jewish by the law had regularly borrowed books from the organization. In 
one abandoned lodging, for instance, there was a copy of  a book entitled Mit 
ér az ember, ha magyar (What a man is worth if  he is Magyar?) by the well-known 
50  Kádár and Vági, Hullarablás, 312.
51  On June 2, two cities in northern Transylvania, Nagyvárad and Kolozsvár, were bombed by the allied 
air forces. These bombings were part of  the preparatory military operations for the landing in Normandy 
and they targeted first and foremost the railway junctions and industrial and military establishments. 
“Üzlethelyiséghez jutottak a kolozsvári bombakárosult kisiparosok és kiskereskedők” [Tradesmen and 
shopkeepers who suffered losses in the bombings have received premises for their businesses], Keleti Újság, 
June 17, 1944, 5.
52  “A városi iparhatóság folyósítja a zsidó üzletek alkalmazottainak járandóságát” [The municipal 
industrial authorities will cover the unpaid wages of  employees of  Jewish businesses], Keleti Újság, May 16, 
1944, 8.
53  Decree number 1600/1944. ME., which was adopted on April 14, 1944 and announced on April 
16, concerned the obligation of  people who were defined as Jews by the law to report their wealth. It also 
addressed the seizure of  this wealth by the organs of  state administration. In accordance with the decree, 
bank accounts, deposits, and securities owned by Jews were seized, as were articles and jewelry made 
of  precious metals. The law made it possible for the state to use the sums of  money in the seized bank 
accounts to pay the wages of  “Christian” employees. Budapesti Közlöny, April 16, 1944, 2.
54  SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 151, archival number 219, box 3, dossier 25/1944, f. 1.
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populist writer of  the era, Péter Veres.55 It is a sad and perverse irony of  fate that 
the pages of  this book, in which the author expresses his concern for the fate of  
the Hungarian peasantry, were being turned by a reader who was defined as an 
outsider (a non-Hungarian) and condemned to deportation.
The Costs of  Ghettoization, Unpaid Assistance, and Food Ration Cards
With regards to the costs that arose in the course of  ghettoization and the 
fulfillment of  the individual requests that were made for reimbursement or 
reparation, these questions were addressed in the confidential deportation 
decree of  April 7, 1944 (Minister of  the Interior’s Confidential Decree number 
6163/1944) and a notice that was issued on April 19, which was a supplement 
to the decree.56 Neither document contained concrete instructions, but the 
document of  April 19 specified that costs were to be covered using assets that 
had been seized from Jewish homes and places of  business.57 An internal decree 
issued on May 13, 1944 by foreign Minister Andor Jaross provided additional 
directions. The costs of  the transportation of  Jews to the ghettos were to be 
covered with the assets that had been taken from them. People who were not 
defined under law as Jewish but who nonetheless were compelled to vacate their 
dwellings because of  the ghettoization were only entitled to compensation under 
extraordinary circumstances and with extraordinary justification. According to 
the decree, settlements in which ghettos were established had to cover the costs 
that arose as a consequence of  this using money from their own coffers. They 
were given the promise that in time the state treasury would repay them for these 
costs. In some cases, the Ministry of  Interior provided some settlements with an 
advance to ensure the completion of  the operations. However, in every case the 
local authorities were expected to be frugal and keep costs to a bare minimum.58 
In principle, the costs of  ghettoization were to be covered using funds from the 
central “Jewish account” (number 157.880), which was created by the state in 
June 1944 and was under the administration of  the Ministry of  Finance. Monies 
from this account were also to be used to cover the taxes and dues, unpaid 
55  SJAN Harghita (Miercurea Ciuc Office of  the Romanian National Archive), Fond no. 32 (Mayor’s 
Office of  Miercurea Ciuc), dossier 72, f. 24.
56  On the text of  the decree see: Zoltán Vági, László Csősz, and Gábor Kádár, The Holocaust in Hungary. 
Evolution of  a Genocide (Plymouth: AltaMira Press, USHMM, 2013), 76–79.
57  Kádár and Vági, Hullarablás, 286.
58  Ibid., 287–93.
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public works bills, and private debts of  individuals who had been deported.59 
Indeed articles had been published in the press on the issue of  unpaid public 
and private debts at the beginning of  the process of  ghettoization.60 The mayors 
dealt with bills that had been sent to people who had already been deported 
(electricity bills, for instance). As early as May 12, the mayor of  Nagyvárad had 
given instructions regarding the settlement of  debts to the public works.61 
As I will discuss, private individuals who participated in the ghettoization 
and deportation of  the Jews of  northern Transylvania were given payment or 
compensation in response to their demands only with great difficulty or not at 
all. One of  the reasons for this was that in September and October of  1944, 
Soviet and Romanian troops began to take control of  the territory. From then 
on, it became almost impossible to receive any compensation from the state 
authorities for costs incurred in the processes of  ghettoization and deportation.
The various jobs and tasks that arose as the ghettos were created, during the 
process of  transporting the Jews to the ghettos, during the period in which the 
ghettos were in use, and then as they were liquidated either were done by the 
people of  the settlements and the subordinate institutions at their own expense 
or were performed by private individuals who had been hired to provide their 
services. These private individuals or the offices that represented their interests 
turned to the mayors of  the settlements for payment of  wages for services 
rendered. The settlements then asked for compensation for these costs from 
the state treasury. From the perspective of  the local authorities, one of  the most 
cost-efficient tools in the creation of  the ghettos was the use of  forced Jewish 
labor. In other cases, the Jews who had been moved into the ghettos had to 
create the conditions necessary for (temporary) survival. In the early days, the 
authorities, “moved to act by their good faith,” gathered the Jews together in 
the collection centers so rapidly that problems arose concerning the acquisition 
of  the necessary materials.62 Only with the passing of  several days could the 
ghettos be made more or less habitable. In Dés, the suggestion was made to 
59  Ibid., 294–95.
60  “Mi lesz a zsidók köz- és magánjellegű tartozásaival?” [How will the private and public debts of  the 
Jews be handled?], Ellenzék, May 5, 1944, 2.
61  Decree number 13392/1944. II, issued by László Gyapay on May 12, 1944. YVA, TR. 16, dossier 28, 
f. 19.
62  Gendarme lieutenant colonel László Ferenczy used the expression “good faith” in his report of  
May 5, 1944. He also notes how the authorities in northern Transylvania rounded up the people who had 
been defined as Jewish by the law “in general with the greatest willingness, expeditiousness, and flexibility.” 
Molnár, Csendőrtiszt a Markóban, 285.
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move the Jews who had been gathered together, more than 5,000 people, to 
the ghetto of  Szamosújvár (today Gherla in Romania), since the camp which 
had been established in the Bungur forest lacked any trace of  infrastructure. 
However, count Béla Bethlen, lord lieutenant of  Szolnok-Doboka County, 
quickly intervened, and on May 5 and 6 he had building materials sent for the 
construction of  a camp in Dés. In the end, no one was moved.63 The construction 
of  a plank fence around the ghetto of  Nagyvárad was done by local carpenters 
and joiners. Twenty inmates from forced labor camps, who represented a free 
source of  labor, were sent to assist them.64 In Beszterce, on the days leading up 
to ghettoization, 50 to 80 local Jewish men were forced to help built barracks on 
the territory of  the ghetto.65 Forced labor units were dispatched to work at sites 
in the territories of  Trianon Hungary as well. In the city of  Pécs, for instance, 
construction on the wattle fence that surrounded the ghetto had been begun by 
people who had been sent to the ghetto and then was completed by forced labor 
units.66
In general, the representative bodies of  municipal government authorized 
the mayor to pay the various costs that arose. In many cases, this authorization 
was retroactive, meaning it applied to payments that had already been made. 
The bureaucratic jargon in the following excerpt from the records of  a meeting 
of  the body of  representatives of  Szilágysomlyó (today şimleu Silvaniei in 
Romania) offers a clear impression of  how the measures that were taken against 
members of  the local population who were defined as Jewish were reduced to a 
mere question of  administrative procedure: 
The body of  representatives of  the Hungarian city of  Szilágysomlyó 
approves the declaration of  the mayor of  the city according to which, 
with regards to the costs that have arisen in connection with the 
gathering together of  the Jews of  Szilágy county and their transport to 
a camp and the costs of  the maintenance of  the camp itself, the visit 
and negotiation of  the lord lieutenant of  the county that took place on 
April 29, 1944 in the communities of  Szilágysomlyó and Somlyócsehi 
[today Cehei in Romania] made provisions to the effect that for the 
moment these costs would be covered with an advance from the 
63  Molnár, Csendőrtiszt a Markóban, 286.
64  Miklós Dános, “Tanúságtétel,” in A tegnap városa. A nagyváradi zsidóság emlékkönyve, ed. Dezső Schön 
(Tel-Aviv: Nagyváradról Elszármazottak Egyesülete, 1981), 336.
65  Braham, The Geographical Encyclopedia of  the Holocaust, 199.
66  Judit Molnár, “‘Hazafias tisztelettel’. Zsidók és nem zsidók Pécsett a holokauszt idején,” in Tanulmányok 
a holokausztról, vol. 2, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2002), 262.
The Holocaust as an Administrative Issue in Northern Transylvania
659
coffers of  the Hungarian city of  Szilágysomlyó and the Ministry of  
Interior of  the Hungarian Kingdom will provide reimbursement and 
has instructed the mayor of  the city to issue the money order.67
Some requests for reimbursement and compensation were made in the first 
days following ghettoization, though most of  these requests were made around 
the time of  or after the deportations. The offices of  the mayor in the various 
settlements answered only with considerable delay, and in many cases they 
rejected the requests. In general, requests made by private individuals involved 
reimbursement for the costs of  transportation or payment for work done by 
craftsmen (for instance joiner’s work and carpentry). In many cases, owners of  
cars and wagons had been compelled personally to assist with the transportation 
of  Jews to the ghettos or had had to allow the authorities to use their vehicles. 
On May 13 and 14, 1944, the ghetto command had made use of  the car owned 
by cab-driver Márton Dankó of  Kolozsvár. On June 14, the city paid him 384 
pengő in compensation.68
In the ghettos, for a daily wage midwives were hired to perform body 
searches, which included searches of  body cavities. On May 29 and 30 and 
June 3, Mrs. György Dumitrán, a midwife under the authority of  Borpataktelep 
performed body searches in the small ghetto of  Nagybánya, for which she was 
paid 16 pengő. There were cases in Hungary in which the midwives were paid 
even more for these searches. In Szeged midwives were paid 20 pengő per day 
for their services, and doctors were paid 200 pengő per day.69 The midwife in 
Nagybánya was only one of  the many “costs” covered by the city. According to 
statements of  account issued on August 8 and September 4, 1944, there were 56 
“services” for which payments totaling 38,734 had been made. This of  course 
only represents the sum of  the costs for which claims had been made before July 
5 and which had been covered between July 5 and 31 from the city coffers.70 It is 
67  YVA TR. 16, dossier 42, f. 204.
68  SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 1 (Mayor’s Office of  Cluj), box 201–7325/1944, dossier 23079/1944, f. 1–4. On 
the payments that were made to cover other transportation costs in Kolozsvár see SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 1, 
box 201–7325/1944, dossier 20220/1944, f. 1–2.
69  Judit Molnár, Zsidósors 1944-ben az V. (szegedi) csendőrkerületben (Budapest: Cserépfalvi Kiadó, 1995), 
140–41.
70  Other important kinds of  costs included: the purchase of  lime, building materials and cleaning tools, 
disinfection, payments to a local printing press for printed material, plumbing, the digging of  sewage lines, 
telephone costs, the costs involved with care provided for the sick who had been taken to the state hospital, 
the daily wages for guards and midwives, and burials. SJAN Maramureş, Fond no. 1, Acte Administrative, 
dossier 1168/1944, vol. 2, f. 87 and 280–86.
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worth noting that the city covered the costs of  transportation for mayor Károly 
Tamássy to the meeting on the details of  deportation process that took place in 
Munkács on May 12 using monies that had been stolen from Jews.71 The costs 
of  the burial of  the corpses of  three deportees that were removed from a train 
passing through Nagybánya on June 7 were also covered using these monies. 
The train had probably arrived from Marosvásárhely (it passed through the city 
of  Kassa, today Košice in Slovakia, on June 8). It was carrying elderly people 
and the sick from various settlements. According to the health officer of  the 
first district in Nagybánya, the station agents in Zilah and Zsibó (today Jibou in 
Romania) had already refused to allow the train to unload the three cadavers. In 
Nagybánya they were given a simple burial.72
The rejection of  a request for the payment of  costs was sometimes justified 
with the claim that the monies that had been expropriated from the Jews had 
already been transferred in their entirety to the central account. On September 
6, 1944, the mayor of  Nagybánya used this explanation when rejecting a request 
that had been submitted significantly earlier, on July 7. In this petition, a city 
alderman named István Ágoston had requested the daily wages for four contract 
workers for the services they had performed transporting foodstuffs from the 
homes of  Jews to the ghetto, providing assistance loading Jews onto train cars, 
and taking care of  storerooms. The mayor advised the alderman to turn with his 
petition to the financial directorship of  Szatmárnémeti.73 
In the process of  creating the ghettos, it was not possible to avoid compelling 
some Christian families to move. In some cases, for instance the ghettos of  
Szatmárnémeti and Nagyvárad, this meant changes of  dwelling on a massive 
scale. In other places, it affected only a few families. In Kolozsvár, working-class 
families who were forced to leave their domiciles in the brick factory, which was 
used as the site of  the ghetto, were given new lodgings in homes that had been 
taken from Jewish families. According to the newspaper Keleti Újság (Eastern 
News), the municipal authorities even took into consideration the size of  the 
family in question. Families with two children were given dwellings with at least 
two separate rooms and a kitchen. Larger families were given homes with three 
rooms and a kitchen. By May 5, more than thirty Hungarian working-class 
71  Ibid., f. 280, Kádár and Vági, Hullarablás, 286–96.
72  The report number 90/1044. v.o. of  the medical officer of  the first district to the mayor of  Nagybánya, 
June 7, 1944. SJAN Maramureş, Fond no. 1, Acte Administrative, dossier 1168/1944, vol. 1, f. 58.
73  Ibid., dossier 44/1944, vol. 1, f. 467–68.
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families had been moved to new lodgings in Kolozsvár.74 The other properties 
that had been forcibly vacated by the Jewish families were made available to 
people whose homes had been damaged in the bombing of  the city that had 
taken place on June 2. According to the financial directorship in Kolozsvár, by 
the second half  of  June some 1,300 dwellings that had been expropriated from 
Jewish families had been allotted to them.75 These forced changes of  dwelling 
often gave rise to sentiments of  dissatisfaction among the people who were 
moved into the homes that had been vacated. There were two main reasons for 
this. Some of  them did not find the new homes suitable and therefore felt that 
they had been unfairly treated. Others, having returned to their original homes 
following the deportations, complained that their domiciles had been seriously 
damaged and requested compensation.76 Some were dissatisfied because, 
following the deportation of  the Jews, they were compelled to return to their 
original homes, which were not as comfortable as the dwellings in which they had 
been temporarily housed. The people who had been assigned lodging in homes 
that had been stolen from Jewish families had to leave their temporary domiciles 
by a given deadline that varied from settlement to settlement. They had to return 
the keys to the local financial directorship. They were given compensation out 
of  the city coffers for damages that had been done to their original homes, and 
the costs of  the moves were also covered. On July 9, 1944 (i.e. some six weeks 
after the deportations), the mayor of  Máramarossziget ordered the people who 
had been moved into temporary lodgings to return to their homes, and he gave 
them sixteen days to do so (the deadline was July 25). Families were only allowed 
to remain in the lodgings to which they had been temporarily assigned if  their 
original homes were in potentially life-threatening or uninhabitable condition 
74  “Eddig hatezerre tehető a táborba telepített kolozsvári zsidók száma” [At the moment, the number 
of  Jews who have been put in the camp has reached 6,000], Keleti Újság, May 6, 1944, 5., Compare with: 
“Harmincegy kolozsvári munkáscsaládot zsidó lakásokban helyeztek el” [Thirty-one Kolozsvár working-
class families have been placed in Jewish apartments], Ellenzék, May 5, 1944, 3.
75  According to an earlier report in the press, in Kolozsvár slightly fewer families, some 1,200, were left 
homeless as a consequence of  the bombings. “A Kolozsvárt ért terrortámadás szomorú statisztikája” [The 
sad statistics of  the bombing of  Kolozsvár], Ellenzék, June 15, 1944, 2. “Ezerháromszáz zsidó lakást utaltak 
ki a bombakárosultaknak” [1,300 Jewish apartments were turned over to people who suffered damages in 
the bombing], Keleti Újság, June 23, 1944, 8.
76  See for instance the complaint of  Sándor Kovács to the mayor of  Nagybánya, in which he asks for 
compensation for the damages that were done to his dwelling in the confines of  the ghetto. The real estate, 
he contended, was so damaged that he was unable to move back into it. SJAN Maramureş, Fond no. 1, Acte 
Administrative, dossier 1168/1944, f. 338.
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or they had in the meantime had another child and therefore required a larger 
home.77 
From the perspective of  the authorities, the complete deprivation of  the 
rights of  members of  the citizenry who were defined under law as Jews was 
accompanied by a “fortunate” drop in expenses. Jews who had been isolated 
in the ghettos were no longer seen as worthy by the civil servants of  receiving 
various subsidies and benefits. Bureaucratic habit inclined Sándor Gyulafalvi 
Rednik, the mayor of  Máramarossziget, to submit a request to the sub-prefect 
on April 29, 1944 for an adjustment to the war relief  payments to be made in 
the month of  May. The sub-prefect’s response, which was dated May 12, made 
it clear that, in accordance with the oral instructions that had been given during 
a talk with Pál Tomcsányi Vilmos, the military operations commissioner of  
Ungvár (today Uzhhorod in Ukraine), on May 6, Jews who earlier had received 
war relief  payments but who in the meantime had been removed to the ghetto 
had lost any and all legal claim to such payments.78
There was also no need to provide sugar rations for Jews. On May 31, 1944, 
the mayor of  Szatmárnémeti informed the Ministry of  Public Nutrition that 
the 17,650 “Jewish sugar ration cards” that the county usually received had not 
yet arrived.79 However, it would have been quite impossible to have distributed 
these sugar ration cards, since the deportations were already underway. Food 
ration cards could not be distributed among the Jews of  Kolozsvár for the same 
reason. According to news that was reported on May 23, 1944, new food ration 
cards were to be distributed among the Jews of  the city, who had been compelled 
to wear the yellow star to identify them, on May 25, precisely the day on which 
the first train destined for Auschwitz departed from Kolozsvár. The reports in 
the press were not really intended for those whom they would, in principle, have 
affected, but rather served merely as a means of  distracting and placating the 
Christian population.80 
77  “Felhívás a gettóbeli lakosokkal kapcsolatban” [Appeal in connection with the inhabitants of  the 
ghetto], Máramaros, July 9, 1944, 4.
78  YVA, TR. 16, dossier 43, f. 94.
79  Ibid., dossier 29, f. 108.
80  “Május 25-én kezdődik Kolozsváron a zsidók új élelmiszerjegyeinek kiosztása” [In Kolozsvár, the 
distribution of  the new Jewish food ration cards will begin on May 25], Keleti Újság, May 23 1944, 5.
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Liquidation and Assessment of  Damages
As soon as the last transports had departed from the ghettos, the territories began 
to be emptied. In general, considerable emphasis was placed on disinfection and 
proper cleaning. In many settlements, the locals complained that the scraps of  
food, the trash, and the latrines that had been left behind gave off  a terrible 
smell and posed a threat of  contamination or contagion.81 Yet following the 
deportations, the ghettos were first plundered and only then disinfected. In 
Nagyvárad the ghetto was left unguarded for a few days. The articles of  everyday 
use that had been left in the buildings became spoils for the taking. Then the 
forced labor unit of  the anti-aircraft defense squadron that was stationed in 
the city was assigned the task of  gathering together and sorting the furniture, 
clothing, and other items of  value that had been left behind and transporting 
them to the Orthodox synagogue, which had been turned into a repository.82 
If  there were forced labor units in or near a settlement, it was general practice, 
following the deportations, to make use of  them in the transportation of  
valuables and belongings that had been left in the ghettos. Trucks and wagons 
were used to transport these items in Nagyvárad and the other settlements as 
well. 
In many cases, the procurement of  means of  transportation presented a 
considerable problem for local administrators. In Kolozsvár, the belongings 
that had been left behind in the ghetto or in the forcibly vacated homes were 
transported using vehicles belonging to the municipal sanitation unit, which so 
dramatically hindered the transportation of  waste that it threatened the public 
health of  the city. For this reason, on August 16 the mayor decided in the future 
to use only privately owned vehicles for the transportation of  items that had 
once belonged to Jews.83
Most of  the ghettos were in horrible condition for months following the 
deportations and even following liberation. Anything of  value was looted, but 
heaps of  debris and items of  everyday use were left behind. When Ernő (Ernest) 
Marton, who earlier had been a Zionist leader, came to northern Transylvania 
in November 1944, he made the following observation: “The sight of  these 
ghettos is heart-rending even today. Broken furniture, household items that are 
now useless, layers of  feathers from torn pillows, the remains of  prayer books, 
81  See also: Molnár, Zsidósors 1944-ben, 152.
82  Tereza Mózes, Evreii din Oradea (Bucharest: Editura Hasefer, 1997), 230–32.
83  SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 1, box 24066–109499/1944, dossier 32503/1944. f. 1.
664
Hungarian Historical Review 4,  no. 3  (2015): 641–672
and inch-thick grime all indicate that months ago thousands of  innocent people 
suffered in these houses and awaited their doom.”84
Damages were done to the buildings in the ghettos and the brick factories 
that were used as sites for ghettos. The assessment of  these damages and the 
arrangement of  compensation constituted new administrative burdens for the 
authorities and the municipal leadership. The dossier on the assessment of  
damages done to the Municipal Brick Factory, which was used as the ghetto in 
Kolozsvár, has survived, and it offers a detailed overview of  the process of  how 
these kinds of  damages were assessed.85 According to the ascertainment of  the 
engineers’ office, the replacement of  items that were missing and the repairs that 
would be necessary would cost 3,900 pengő in total, which (in line with customary 
practice) the city would pay for using the assets that had been stolen from the 
Jews.86 This sum, however, was significantly less than the estimate that had been 
given by the Municipal Brick Industry Corporation on May 27. According to the 
managers of  the factory, the damages would cost some 70,880 pengő, and they 
predicted that this sum would grow.87 Following the deportations, the factory 
requested compensation several times for the damages that had been incurred, 
but no complete settlement was ever made. These questions were decisively 
influenced by the fact that by the autumn of  1944, the Soviet and Romanian 
armies had reached the borders of  the city. On September 16, the decree to 
evacuate the city was issued, and on that very day the Hungarian authorities, who 
were fleeing, closed the city’s coffers.88 
Conclusion
As the cases I have discussed in this essay demonstrate, the implementation of  
the Final Solution in northern Transylvania, in other words, the expropriation 
and annihilation of  the Jewry of  the territory, involved a complex state apparatus 
consisting of  civil servants, units responsible for the maintenance of  order and 
defense, and even intellectuals and technical experts (engineers, physicians, 
teachers, and economists). The anti-Semitic measures, which were adopted 
84  Attila Gidó, “Marton Ernő beszámolója az észak-erdélyi zsidóság helyzetéről 1944 novemberében,” 
Pro Minoritate 2 (2015): 49.
85  SJAN Cluj, Fond no. 1, box 201–7325/1944, dossier 23559/1944, f. 7–12.
86  Ibid., f. 13.
87  The trampling and ruining of  the gardens given to the workers in the factory were mentioned among 
the damages. Ibid., f. 14.
88  Ibid., f. 15.
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in a period of  only a few weeks, created serious administrative challenges for 
this apparatus and, furthermore, had negative material consequences for some 
segments of  the so-called Christian population. Problems involving production 
and provisions arose in several branches of  the economy, and the lack of  trained 
experts and specialists, which had already been a problem, became worse.89 
Others, however, profited from the situation. They submitted claims for 
compensation, denounced people to the authorities, plundered, and moved up 
on the professional ladders. The relocation of  some lower ranking and mid-level 
leaders (some of  whom had left Transylvania in the 1920s and were returning 
to communities from which they had become distant) from Trianon Hungary to 
the newly acquired territory also increased the “efficiency” with which the Final 
Solution was implemented. For bureaucrats who often barely knew the people 
of  the communities to which they had been assigned, loyalty to the regime 
proved stronger than any solidarity with the local Jews.
It would be difficult to produce a balance sheet for the implementation of  the 
Final Solution in northern Transylvania, much as the costs incurred by Hungary 
and the material losses of  the Jewry also rest on rough estimates. For this reason, 
I have attempted first and foremost to analyze a few kinds of  costs.90 As far as 
the question of  the actual value of  the real estate and belongings that were stolen 
by the Hungarian authorities, the Germans, the locals, and the soldiers who 
passed through region in the autumn of  1944 is concerned, we cannot know this 
with any precision, just as we cannot know precisely the value of  the things that 
were destroyed in the course of  the war and the pillaging. The 1946 assessment 
(which survives only in fragments) of  the situation in Transylvania by the World 
89  There were some 700 doctors in northern Transylvania in 1941, for example. 44.5 percent of  them 
were defined as Jewish under the law. Thus as a consequence of  the deportations, the number of  doctors in 
the region, which was already low, was reduced to half. On the negative economic consequences see: Gábor 
Kádár and Zoltán Vági, “A ‘zsidókérdés megoldása’ a ‘termelés szempontjai’ ellen. A magyar holokauszt 
gazdasági vetületei,” in A holokauszt Magyarországon európai perspektívában, ed. Judit Molnár (Budapest: Balassi 
Kiadó, 2005), 514–27, Csősz László, “Őrségváltás? Az 1944-es deportálások közvetlen gazdasági-társadalmi 
hatásai,” in Küzdelem az igazságért. Tanulmányok Randolph L. Braham 80. születésnapjára, ed. László Karsai and 
Judit Molnár (Budapest: MAZSIHISZ, 2002).
90  According to contemporary anti-Semitic statistics, in 1938 the Jewry possessed a fortune amounting 
to some 7–12 billion pengő. The claim was also made that this sum constituted a significant proportion, 
between 20 and 25 percent, of  the wealth of  Hungary. The reliability of  these figures was most recently 
debated by Hungarian historians in 2014. Gábor Kádár, and Zoltán Vági, Self-Financing Genocide. The Gold 
Train, the Becher Case and the Wealth of  Hungarian Jews (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2004), 35–25, 
Cf. Dániel Bolgár, “Mese a zsidó jólétről,” Magyar Narancs 29 (2014), accessed July 27, 2015, http://
magyarnarancs.hu/publicisztika/mese-a-zsido-joletrol-90944.
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Jewish Congress contains precise information on the material losses of  a few 
hundred Holocaust survivors. According to it, the value of  the properties stolen 
from 316 survivors from Kolozsvár, Nagyvárad, and Nagykároly (today Carei 
in Romania) came to 219,064,631 pengő and 367,902,000 lei.91 A memorandum 
sent to the government commission for Jewish property by the deputy mayor of  
Nagyvárad in June, 1944 offers a rough idea of  the scale of  the properties stolen 
from the Jews of  the city. According to the memorandum, 4,700 dwellings were 
left empty following the ghettoization of  the Jews, with some 13,000 rooms and 
4,000 kitchens and larders. Furthermore, 600 businesses and 500 workshops 
and factories were taken from residents who had been defined under the law as 
Jews.92 
As is clear, the value of  the property, both real estate and belongings, that 
was taken from the 164,000 former citizens of  northern Transylvania must have 
come to billions of  pengő before the Holocaust. A significant share of  this 
property came into the hands of  the Hungarian state and the civil servants, 
gendarmes, and police who took part in the ghettoization and deportation, as 
well as the civilians who submitted claims for reimbursement or simply looted. 
In comparison, the costs that arose in connection with the expropriation, 
ghettoization, and deportation of  the Hungarian Jewry of  the provinces were 
slight. Historians have not yet arrived at any precise estimate of  how much 
the ghettoization and deportation of  the Jewry of  northern Transylvania cost 
(even disregarding the damages caused to the national economy). In 1945, the 
National Audit Office estimated that costs of  the ghettoization and deportation 
of  the Hungarian Jewry of  the provinces came to 60 million pengő.93 There are 
also estimates regarding the costs of  the transport of  the Jewish populations of  
some individual Hungarian settlements. In the case of  the Jews of  the city of  
Mohács and the surrounding area, these costs were estimated at 70,000 pengő. 
In the case of  the ghetto of  Szeged, we know the costs of  the creation of  the 
91  The costs of  damages listed in questionnaires as part of  the assessment that was done in 1946 were 
rough estimates and were based on the individual assessments of  the survivors. They moved on a wide 
scale of  income categories. 316 questionnaires survived only by chance. Basically the things that survived 
did so in spite of  the careless circumstances in which they were stored. Attila Gidó and Zsuzsa Sólyom, 
The Surviving Jewish Inhabitants of  Cluj, Carei and Oradea. The Survey of  the World Jewish Congress in 1946 (Cluj-
Napoca: ISPMN Working Papers, Nr. 35, 2010), 41.
92  “Emlékiratban foglalta össze Nagyvárad városa a zsidókérdés rendezésével felvetődött megoldatlan 
problémákat” [The city of  Nagyvárad summarized in a memorandum the unsolved problems involving the 
settlement of  the Jewish Question]. Ellenzék June 17, 1944, 12.
93  Kádár and Vági, Hullarablás, 287.
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camp, the transportation of  Jews, and the provision of  food, which in total 
came to more than 32,300 pengő.94 The creation of  the ghetto of  Túrkeve, 
which “housed” some 160 individuals, cost almost 50,000 pengő. This sum 
includes a plank fence (18,000 pengő) and the sanitation equipment, daily wages, 
transportation charges, etc.95 The construction of  the three-meter-high plank 
fence surrounding the ghetto of  Zalaegerszeg is estimated to have cost 40,000 
pengő. The forcible relocation of  the Jews of  Sátoraljaújhely to a single part 
of  the city and the resulting relocation of  some so-called Christian families 
cost 90,000 pengő. Transportation (to the ghettos and then deportation to the 
extermination camps) cost several million pengő.96
In the case of  northern Transylvania, we only have partial amounts. We 
cannot assess the total costs, and it is not entirely clear that we would arrive 
at a useful figure if  we were to attempt to determine the “share” of  the 60 
million pengő (the estimated cost of  the ghettoization and deportation of  the 
Hungarian Jewry of  the provinces according to the National Audit Office) that 
was “spent” on the 131,639 people deported from northern Transylvania (it 
would be roughly 18 million pengő). We have the greatest amount of  detailed 
data on the small and large ghettos of  Nagybánya. The cost of  the creation and 
maintenance of  the larger ghetto, which “housed” 3,660 people, came to 38,734 
pengő, including the daily wages of  the “Christians” who “provided services.” 
Following the liquidation of  the smaller ghetto, where some 2,000 people were 
held, the cost of  the damages that had been done was estimated at 30,000 pengő. 
If  these sums are applied to all of  the 131,639 people who were deported from 
northern Transylvania, the costs incurred in the process of  ghettoization and 
deportation would come to 1.4 million pengő and the damages would come to 
roughly 2 million pengő, for a total of  3.4 million pengő. Naturally, this sum is 
not reliable, since the process by which it has been reached contains numerous 
possibilities for error. In individual settlements and areas the costs and the 
damages depended in part on whether or not in the given ghetto or collection 
camp existing edifices and infrastructure were used, how many people they were 
intended to “house,” the extent to which the local authorities had been frugal, 
and the length of  time during which the ghetto was in use. The transportation 
94  Ibid., Molnár Judit, Zsidósors 1944-ben, 144.
95  Csősz, Őrségváltás, 84.
96  The sums are included in László Karsai, A holokauszt utolsó fejezete, Beszélő 10 (2005), accessed June 
22, 2015, http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/a-holokauszt-utolso-fejezete. 
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costs of  deportation must also be added, and they may have come to several 
million pengő in northern Transylvania as well.
However, it is quite clear that, following the liberation of  the region, only a 
small fraction of  the wealth that had been stolen was returned to the few survivors. 
In November 1944, Ernő Marton informed the Romanian government and the 
international Jewish organizations of  the difficulties regarding the recovery of  
stolen properties. In the course of  the trip he took through northern Transylvania, 
Marton observed that the military and civilian authorities of  the region, which 
had only been liberated a few weeks earlier, were hindering the reacquisition of  
stolen wealth. He ascertained with considerable concern and consternation that 
the returning survivors had to confront the people who had persecuted them: 
“the Hungarian civil servants who did not flee with the retreating Hungarian and 
German troops continue to serve in their positions, even though many of  them 
displayed fascist conduct and took part in the implementation of  the brutal 
measures of  the Hungarian government. Some segments of  the civil guard, 
which was created to replace the gendarmerie and the police, also consist of  
such fascist elements, which contributes to a great extent to the aggravation of  
uncertainty and doubt.”97
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